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Abstract 
 
We study the impact of different contractual arrangements within the hospital on the optimal contracts 
designed by third party payers when severity is hospital's private information. We develop a multi-issue 
bargaining process between doctors and managers within the hospital. Results are then compared with a 
scenario where doctors and managers decide independently by maximizing their own profit, with managers 
proposing to doctors a take-it-or leave-it offer. Results show that, when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, 
the informational rent arising on information asymmetry is higher in a set up where managers and doctors 
decide together through a strategic bargaining process than when they act as two decision-making units. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Strategic Bargaining; Optimal Contracts; Hospitals; Asymmetric Information 
 
JEL classification: I11, I18. 
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1. Introduction 
 
It is often debated by health economists and policy makers which organizational frame could provide better 
incentives to the different actors within the health care sector. The relevance of such analysis is motivated 
in light of the rise of health care spending as a share of GDP. Indeed over the period 1960 to 1992, OECD 
countries have experienced a rise, on average, of more than 4% points, from under 4% to slightly more than 
8% (Mossialos and Le Grand, 1999; OECD, 2000). Since public funding is the major funding source for 
most OECD countries, accounting for, in 2001, an average share of 72.6% (Mossialos and Le Grand, 1999; 
OECD, 2000) of total expenditure,
1
 a steady growth of health expenditure might give rise to serious 
concerns about the sustainability of public budgets.
2
  Therefore, controlling the growth of health 
expenditure has assumed increasing relevance in the public policy agenda of most OECD countries and 
has, therefore, lead to several financial reforms. 
 
Financial policies have focused on, but have not been restricted to, mechanisms to control the financial 
flows, either from third party payers to providers, or between third party payers and patients. Indeed, on the 
supply side, changes within EU financing mechanisms have focused on hospital cost control (Mossialos, 
2002). 
 
Several theoretical studies have analysed the design of optimal payment systems to induce optimal 
behaviour by providers, i.e. induce optimal levels of quality, cost containment effort and the optimal number 
of treatments (see for example Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; Ma, 1994; Rickman and 
McGuire, 1999; Ellis and McGuire, 1986; Ellis, 1998). 
 
A common assumption, in this literature is that the hospital is considered as a singleton, a sort of black box. 
However, in practice, the hospital is a product of an array of different agents with different, and sometimes 
conflicting, objectives. For example in England, Foundation Trusts' boards of governors (with an average 
size of 33 members) are comprised of a diversity of members enabling patients, the public and staff 
members to elect representatives so that their interests and views are reflected on the organisations' 
governance. The board of governors will then interact with the board of directors, comprising non-executive 
and executive directors (with normally a maximum of 12 members), balancing the skills and experience to 
meet the organization needs (Department of Health, 2006). 
 
Indeed, within the hospital, different staff groups will have different objectives. While doctors and 
consultants are normally seen as being interested in expanding the amount and quality of care supplied, 
managers are expected to be more interested in hospital surplus and breaking even (Crilly and Le Grand, 
2004). Therefore, the relative strength of these different groups is likely to have an impact on resource 
allocation and, ultimately, on hospital performance (Pauly, 1978). Moreover, the behaviour of staff will be 
conditioned by the incentives they face, by the institutional arrangements within the hospital as well as by 
the management structures. 
 
Therefore, as pointed out by Harris (1977), regulatory policy should account for its effects on the diverse 
decision units within the hospital. Indeed, our paper departs from most of the existing contributions by 
considering the hospital as the outcome of the interaction between different agents. On this matter Custer et 
al (1990) have analysed the effects of a prospective payment system on the production of the hospital, 
focusing on the relation between the hospital and its medical staff. Other studies that have accounted for 
different incentives within the hospital have modelled hospitals' internal relations by means of 
take-it-or-leave offers made by one of the parties, which amounts to assuming that only the proposer has 
decision power. Boadway et al (2004), in particular, propose a model with managers and doctors as 
decision makers and develop a two-stage agency problem in which contracts are designed to elicit 
                                                 
1
Average of all OECD countries with the exception of Korea, Mexico and the United States. 
 
2
During the 1980s and 1990s we also observe a shift of costs from the public into the private sector that might reflect the financial 
reforms introduced in order to control health expenditure 
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information. Their paper has been extended to consider cooperative bargaining within the hospital by 
Miraldo (2000). 
 
Our paper is closely related to these works and it generalizes Miraldo's (2000) model introducing strategic 
negotiations between doctors and managers within the hospital in the spirit of non-cooperative bargaining. 
The model considers two alternative scenarios of hospitals' organization: the contract and bargaining set-up.  
In both scenarios, a multistage game is modelled, and information is assumed to be symmetric between 
doctors and managers, while asymmetric between the hospital and the government. In both cases, at the 
first stage, the hospital signs a contract with the third party payer on fee for service, lump-sum transfers and 
hospital capacity, in a typical Principal-Agent problem. In the subsequent stages, managers and doctors 
decide on resource allocation within the hospital as well as the number of patients treated with different 
technologies, according to the decision-making process specific to the set-up. In particular, in the 
bargaining set-up, we model a multi-issue non-cooperative bargaining process, between doctors and 
managers, over both fees and treated patients. Outcomes from such negotiations are then compared with 
the contract scenario where doctors and managers decide independently by maximizing their own profit, 
with managers deciding on resource allocation and doctors on treatment allocation. 
 
The results obtained comparing the two scenarios show that when the cost of capital is sufficiently low, the 
informational rent is higher in the set-up where managers and doctors decide together through a strategic 
bargaining process than when they split into two separate decision-making units. 
 
In the next section we describe the assumptions of the model. In section 3 we develop the scenario of 
bargaining within the hospital, while section 4 follows with the case in which managers offer contracts to 
doctors. Government optimal contracts and results are discussed in section 5 and, finally, section 6 
concludes. 
 
 
2. The model 
 
The main actors of our model are the government (G),3 the hospital managers (M) and the doctors (D). 
They differ as far as their objective functions are concerned. In particular, hospital managers aim at 
maximizing the expected financial surplus of the hospital. On the other hand, doctors are interested not only 
in their personal income and exerted level of effort, but also in the improvement in health care status of their 
patients. Finally, government's goal is to trade-off quality of care and health care expenditures.4 
 
We consider two alternative organizational set-ups of hospitals. In both set-ups the government offers a 
contract to the hospitals, specifying a budget (a lump sum  T  ), a capacity ( K  ) and its fee per treated 
patient ( g  ). The two scenarios only differ in the way decisions are made within the hospital. In the contract 
set-up, managers decide the fees per treated patient ( h  ) to be paid to doctors and doctors decide the 
number ( n  ) of patients to be treated. In the bargaining set-up, managers and doctors strategically bargain 
over both the fees ( h  ) and the number ( n  ) of treated patients. We will come back to the specific 
differences between the two set-ups in the next section. However, here it is important to underline that both 
set-ups share a bulk of common modelling assumptions, which we are now going to discuss. 
 
2.1 Hospitals and patients 
 
There are two types of hospital differing on patients' casemix, which we will denote as type  i   with  1,2i   . 
                                                 
3
It can also be thought of as regulator or third party payer. 
 
4
Our model could also apply to other secondary care configurations where the government/regulator decentralizes the procurement of 
health care services to a public organization as it happens, for instance, in England. In this case the government would represent the 
Department of Health, the managers the local Primary Care Trusts, and doctors would represent the hospital. 
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All hospitals serve the same total number of patients. 
Patients of hospital of type  i   differ in the severity of illness  ,is   which is randomly distributed over a 
unitary length interval according to a uniform distribution with mean  iD  , 
 
1 1[ , ]
2 2i i i
s D D    
 
Without loss of generality, type 2 hospital is assumed to have a higher casemix, that is,  2 1.D D!   It is also 
assumed that the mass of patients with a particular realization  is   is equal to one. 
 
The relation between the government and the hospital is modelled as a Principal-Agent problem with 
asymmetric information. Information on patients' severity is shared perfectly within the hospital but is not 
known by the government: the government has no information concerning the hospital's case mix of 
patients in terms of illness severity. The government, however, knows the probability  ip   of a hospital 
being of type  i  , with  1 21p p   . 
 
Patients seek care in their local hospital and are offered one of two treatments, high technology treatment  
H   or low technology treatment  L  . Alternatively, but equivalently, we can think of  H   being treatment 
and  L   no treatment decisions. 
 
The benefit of using high technology therapy in the treatment of a patient increases with the patient's 
severity. In contrast, the health improvement when treatment occurs with therapy  L   is constant, not 
depending on patient's illness severity. The marginal benefit from the each treatment is given by: 
 
( )
( )
H
L
q s as
q s b
 
  
with  0 1b ad  d  . 
 
Note that, while from a patient's perspective high technology therapy is a more effective treatment as long 
as  abs !  , from a cost containment perspective, its unlimited use may not always be efficient. In fact - as it 
will be clear once the agents’ payoff functions are formally introduced - when direct and indirect costs are 
accounted for, and from a social welfare perspective, only high illness severity patients should be treated 
with high technology therapy  H  . That is, the use of high technology therapy is more beneficial when 
hospitals are of type 2. 
 
For the sake of tractability we will conduct our analysis assuming that  0b    and  1a   . This should not 
be seen as a restrictive assumption since, within the treatment versus no treatment taxonomy, it just implies 
that patients with a positive severity must be treated while the remaining should be sent home, what is 
indeed a realistic simplification of hospitals' decisions under financial and capacity constraints. However, it 
is important to underline that our main results remain qualitatively unaffected by instead working with 
generic values for  a   and  b  : only computed explicit solutions and comparisons get far more 
cumbersome.
5
 
 
                                                 
5
Of course such formulation ignores induced demand issues, which are beyond the scope of this paper. Note that the main purpose of 
defining two treatments is simply to represent medical cases for which there exists a threshold of severity beyond which patients have 
a higher benefit from receiving one treatment rather than the other. This is contemplated within our model. 
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Depending on the set-up of the model, treatments will be assigned to patients either by hospitals (when 
doctors and managers act as a unique decision unit) or by doctors only. In general, patients with an illness 
severity above a certain level  is

  will be treated with therapy  H   while the remaining receive treatment  
L  . So the number of patients treated with high technology therapy  in   can be obtained by, 
1
2
ii in sD{  

 
which is clearly increasing in the casemix of the population. The total health status improvement  
 ,i i iQ n D   is then given by: 
     
1 1
2 2
1 1
2 2
2
,
1 1
2 2
i i i
i i i
n
i i i L H
n
i i i
Q n q s ds q s ds
n n
D D
D D
D
D
  
  
{   
§ ·  ¨ ¸© ¹
³ ³
 
 
Differentiating one can see how the total health status improvement is affected by  in   and  iD  : 
 
1
,    0,    1 0
2i i i in i i i n
Q n Q n QD DD§ ·    !  !¨ ¸© ¹  
Namely, the health status improvement is increasing in the average illness severity and on the number of 
patients treated with therapy  H   as long as   12i inD  !  , which is always verified as, by construction,  
1
2i in D   . Finally, the marginal improvement in the health status by treating an extra patient with high 
technology therapy is higher for hospitals serving more severely ill populations. 
 
2.2 Doctors’ problem 
 
In both scenarios, doctors’ utility function is defined by, 
 
  2( , )
2
i
Di i i i i i i
nQ n h g nD3                              (1) 
In other words, within a hospital of type  i  , doctors directly benefit from the improvement in patients health 
status  ( , )i i iQ n D   and from the fees paid by the government ( ig  ) and by the managers ( ih  ) for each 
patient treated with therapy  H  . This doctor reimbursement specification is close to some OECD countries 
that pay specialist physicians using fee-for-service. Specifically, in Austria, France, Mexico, and New 
Zealand, specialists employed in private hospitals are mostly paid by fee-for-service. But also in countries 
where specialists are mostly salaried, such as Australia and England, specialist physicians are paid a 
fee-for-service for treating private patients in public and private hospitals (Simoens and Giuffrida 2004). 
 
Since high technology treatment requires more time and attention, it is also assumed that, when treating 
patients with therapy  H  , doctors should exert a higher effort than the one required under the low 
technology treatment  L  . Therefore, doctors also experience a disutility term  
2
2
in   which is quadratic in the 
number of patients treated with therapy  H  . 
 
If doctors are allowed, as in our contract scenario, to decide the number of treated patients, they clearly set  
in   at a level that maximizes their utility, trading off earned fees and marginal increase of patients' health 
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status on the one hand, and cost of effort, on the other:  
ii i i n
n h g Q     
which, as   12in i iQ nD     becomes:   12
2
i i i
i
h g
n
D     
The optimal number of patients treated with therapy  H   in the contract scenario is increasing in the 
average illness severity of the patients' population and in the fees. 
 
2.3 Managers’ problem 
 
We assume that the managers' objective is to maximize hospital surplus. This assumption may seem 
unrealistic for public hospitals operating in a publicly-funded health care system, since they are usually 
constrained on the distribution of profits. However, it should be noticed that public hospitals may add to their 
reserves the financial surplus obtained. For example, Foundation Trusts in England, despite being public 
organizations, are the residual claimants of their losses. With (elected) decision boards risking their position 
in case the hospital incurs significant losses, these hospitals are, therefore, considered to be profit 
maximizers (Department of Health, 2002a, 2002b). Alternatively hospitals might wish to maximize surplus 
in order to pursue other objectives, such as increasing physician staff, broadening the range of services, or 
even increasing managerial perks (see Chalkley and Malcomson, 1998a and 1998b; De Fraja, 2000; 
Dranove and White, 1994; Rickman and McGuire, 1999). 
 
Managers receive a budget from the government, via a lump-sum transfer  iT  . From this budget managers 
pay doctors a fee for service  ih   for any patient treated with therapy  H  . Finally, we assume that 
managers derive disutility from a non efficient run of the hospital’s capacity,  2 / 2.i in K  Therefore, 
managers' surplus is given by: 
 2
2
i i
Mi i i i
n K
T n h
3                                   (2) 
With the disutility term  
 2
2
i in K   we aim at capturing, in a simple way, some further management concerns, 
such as capacity and congestion issues. In particular, we consider that there exists a technical capacity 
level  iK   for the therapeutical treatment  H  . Capacity  ,iK   on the one hand, measures the maximum 
number of patients that can be effectively treated without further costs. On the other hand, it refers to the 
existence of some fixed costs necessary for the implementation of therapy  ,H   such as the investment in 
a technology, the wages paid to technical staff and nurses, the administrative costs and so on. Therefore, it 
is assumed that whenever the number of patients treated with therapy  H   is different from the technical 
capacity  iK  , managers support an extra (quadratic) cost. In fact, the idea is that if the number of treated 
patients is lower than  iK  , the costs from the fixed technical and administrative structure are not optimally 
recovered. If, on the contrary,  in   is above the capacity, congestion arises in the supply of therapeutic 
treatment in forms of both direct (e.g. extra hours worked by the staff) and indirect costs, such as an 
undesirable increase in queues and waiting times. 
 
Clearly, if the managers were called to choose the number of treated patients, they would set it at a level to 
maximize their own surplus,  i i in K h
    . However, as discussed above, the decision of how many 
patients to treat with therapy  H   is fully in the doctors’ hands within the contract scenario, while it is set 
through negotiations with the doctors in the bargaining scenario. 
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The disutility term  
 2
2
i in K   exhibits a further intuitive interpretation in terms of the impact of capacity in the 
managers’ surplus. In fact  /Mi i i iK n Kw3 w     is positive for  i in K!   and negative otherwise: if the 
number of treated patients exceeds capacity, managers’ surplus increases with  iK  , while it decreases 
when  i in K  . Indeed, if the hospital is already operating at an activity level above  iK  , expanding 
capacity will clearly be beneficial as it allows reducing congestion. On the other hand, if the hospital is 
operating below capacity, then extra capacity will simply increase fixed costs with no counterpart on 
benefits: consider, for instance, a hospital investing in a second Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) 
machine, requiring additional room, equipment, staff and maintenance, while the first MRI is still used far 
below its potential. 
 
2.4 Timing and the contractual arrangements within the hospital 
 
In the first stage, we model a typical Principal-Agent problem where government signs a contract with the 
hospital, represented by the managers.  In particular, the government offers a limited capacity,  iK  , which 
constrains the use of high technology treatment; a lump sum transfer,  iT  , paid to the managers; and a fee,  
ig  , for each patient treated with high technology therapy, paid directly to the doctors.
6
  The financial 
resources received by the manager are then distributed between doctors and managers in the hospital in 
the following stages. 
 
As already discussed, the main difference between set-ups lies in the decision-making process within the 
hospital that can be of two types: contract and bargaining. In particular, in the contract set-up, given the 
government contract, managers decide the fee  ih   which is paid to the doctors for any treated patient, 
while doctors decide the number of patients  in   to be treated. This organizational frame is the one usually 
adopted in the literature and it emphasizes the nature of decentralized decision-making by the different 
subjects in the hospital. We develop it for comparison purposes. In particular, we follow the majority of the  
literature in assuming that such decentralized decisions are taken sequentially and that the managers 
experience a first mover advantage. 
 
In the bargaining set-up, managers and doctors strategically and simultaneously bargain over both the fees  
ih   and number of treated patients  in   . In this scenario, managers and doctors can be seen as a single 
decision making unit setting, through a bargaining process, the overall output   ,i in h  . 
 
Before moving into the details, it is worthwhile noticing that in either case the result of the overall strategic 
interaction may not be efficient from the government point of view, as its objectives partially diverge from the 
ones inherent in the hospital’s internal decisions. In fact, when doctors and managers are considered as 
separate decision-makers, on the one hand, the government shares with doctors the aim of providing an 
effective health status improvement to the most severe patients. However, the costs of provision taken into 
account by the government are different from the ones considered by the doctors, and interests are directly 
conflicting as  ih   is concerned. 
 
On the other hand, the government shares with managers the objective to allocate patients to treatments in 
a cost-effective way in order to keep under control the fees and the overall costs of health care provision. 
However, their interests are also conflicting with respect not only to the lump sum transfer  iT   but also for 
                                                 
6
Note that under our setup the fee can be equivalently interpreted as being a fee-for-service but also a capitation fee. 
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the capacity level  iK   for the high technology treatment. 
 
Our set-up aims at reflecting the current trends in the contractual arrangements between governments and 
hospitals in the European Union. In fact, several governments in Europe, in accordance with their actual 
cost containment policies, attempt to design contracts with hospitals in a way to keep the use of some 
therapies under control and to avoid an over-utilization of expensive treatments. In spite of such supply side 
pressures, many crucial variables, however, can be exclusively controlled by managers and doctors, whose 
objectives may not encompass health care cost containment. 
 
 
3. Bargaining scenario 
 
Under the bargaining scenario, the second (and last) stage consists of a bargaining process between 
doctors and managers. The government allocation   , ,i iTi g K   is taken as given. 
 
3.1 Strategic negotiations between managers and doctors 
 
We solve the second stage of the game using a non-cooperative approach to negotiations among doctors 
and managers. In particular, managers and doctors bargain simultaneously on both the number of patients 
to be treated  in   and the fee for service  ih  . Their dynamic strategic negotiations are modelled as a 
multi-issue bilateral bargaining with random order of proposer following Osborne and Rubinstein (1990) and 
Muthoo (1999). 
 
In fact, at any instant of time  t  , either managers or doctors can be randomly selected respectively with 
probabilities  (1 )E   and  E  , to propose offers to the other party. An offer is a pair   ,i ih n   with  0ih t   
and  0in t  . The other party can just accept or reject that offer. If it accepts, then each party  ,L M D   
takes his payoff  > @ ,i i iL h n3   corresponding to that offer, with  > @ ,i i iL h n3   given by (1) and (2). 
 
If, instead, the responding party rejects the offer, both managers and doctors enter a further stage of 
negotiations. Bargaining effort and trade delays are costly and managers and doctors share the same 
inter-temporal discount factor   0,1G   , with  1G o   describing the limit case of absence of impatience 
frictions. 
 
At the beginning of each further bargaining stage, a new random selection of the party entitled to a make 
proposal is drawn. The game is repeated until managers and doctors agree on a pair   ,i ih n  . If they 
reach an agreement on   ,i ih n   at any time  t  , the discounted final payoff would be  > @ 1 ,t i i iL h nG  3  . 
On the other hand, clearly, if they perpetually disagree, their payoffs will be zero. 
 
The described negotiation game is an infinite horizon dynamic game of complete information: in fact, 
players’ payoff functions are common knowledge and at each move in the game the players know the full 
history of the play thus far. Therefore, in the analysis that follows, we will need to solve the game for its 
subgame perfect Nash equilibria. More precisely, we will look for those players’ strategies, describing a 
complete plan of proposals in the price-offer phases and of decisions of either acceptance or rejection in the 
response phases, which generate a Nash equilibrium in the immediately subsequent price-response 
phases and which constitute a Nash equilibrium in every subgame. 
 
Since this is an infinite horizon game, one cannot use the backward induction method to solve for the 
subgame-perfect Nash equilibria, so that any equilibrium solution of the present game would typically 
involve a high overall complexity. However, following a standard solution in strategic bargaining models, we 
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will only focus on the subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in pure and stationary strategies (PSSPNE) 
satisfying no delay in the trade. Therefore, it is assumed that any trader always proposes the same price at 
every equivalent node where she has to make an offer, and she always behaves in the same way whenever 
facing identical proposals if responding to an offer. Moreover, the property of no delay guarantees that, 
whenever a player has to make an offer, her equilibrium offer is accepted by the other player. 
 
We now characterize the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the   ,i ih n   bargaining game 
between doctors and managers in pure and stationary strategies. Define  > @ > @ ,i ih L n L    the 
PSSPN-equilibrium offer that agent  L   proposes whenever she is selected to make an offer. Furthermore, 
define  > @iV LG    the (discounted) expected equilibrium continuation payoff to player  L   from accessing a 
further round of negotiations. 
 
Suppose managers have been selected to make offers. The equilibrium payoff from rejecting any offer for 
the doctors is, clearly,  > @iV DG   . Perfection of the equilibrium solution requires that the doctors accept 
from the managers any proposal  > @ > @ ,i ih M n M   such that  > @ > @ > @  > @,i i i iD h M n M V DG 3 t  , 
while reject any offer  > @ > @ ,i ih M n M   such that  > @ > @ > @  > @,i i i iD h M n M V DG 3   . Note that we 
have taken advantage of a standard tie-breaking rule by which, if indifferent between rejecting and 
accepting an offer, a player accepts it. Furthermore, the property of no delay implies that in equilibrium  
> @ > @ > @  > @,i i i iD h M n M V DG  3 t  . 
However, it is immediately reckoned that in equilibrium it can never be that:  
> @ > @ > @  > @,i i i iD h M n M V DG  3 !  
as, otherwise, the managers could always increase their profit by offering the doctors a slightly lower fee: in 
fact, they could instead propose a pair  > @ > @ ,i ih M n Mc   , still accepted, with  > @ih Mc   slightly lower than  
> @ih M  , which improves their own payoff. Therefore, it must be that a managers’ equilibrium offer  
> @ > @ ,i ih M n M    is such that: 
> @ > @ > @ max   ,i i iM h M n M3  
 
> @ > @ > @  > @ . . ,i i i is t D h M n M V DG 3   
 
A necessary implication of this is that in equilibrium managers choose a number of patients to be treated at 
which the joint profits of doctors and managers are at the highest possible level. This must hold as any 
potentially attainable surplus share can a fortiori be reached by managers when the total surplus to be 
divided between doctors and managers is maximum. Indeed, the maximum of  > @ > @ > @ ,i i iM h M n M3   
given the constraint  > @ > @ > @  > @,i i i iD h M n M V DG 3    is, by construction, equivalent to the maximum 
of the joint profit  > @ > @ > @  > @ > @ > @ , ,i i i i i iM h M n M D h M n M3 3   valued in  
> @ > @ > @  > @,i i i iD h M n M V DG 3   . Of course, such argument assumes the second order conditions are 
satisfied for the joint profit function, which we will shortly show being indeed the case. 
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Hence, define the joint profit as,  
 22 ( )
2 2
Mi Di
i ii
i i i i
J
n KnT Q n g n
3 { 3 3
    
 
and denote  in

  as the unique solution of  / 0iJ nw 3 w   , i.e. 
1 0
2i i i i
g n KD§ ·     ¨ ¸© ¹  
namely,   12
3
i i i
i
g K
n
D                                          (3) 
Such solution turns out to be a global maximum of the joint profit function: in fact, the second order condition 
is always verified as  
2 2/ 0iJ nw 3 w   . Notice that  in   is increasing with casemix  iD  , i.e. given a fixed  
 ,g K   pair, hospitals of type  2   always treat a larger number of patients than hospitals of type  1 . 
Therefore, in equilibrium it must be true that the managers always offer the doctors a proposed  > @i in M n {   which maximizes their joint profits. Define,  
     
2 2
2 2
i i i
i i i i i
n n K
J n T Q n g n
 
  ª º3     ¬ ¼  
the maximum attainable level of joint profits of doctors and managers, valued at the optimal number of 
admitted patients  in

 . Hence the solution to the managers' program is given by a equilibrium pair  
> @ > @ ,i i ih M n M n     such that: 
> @ > @  > @,i i i i iM h M n J n V DG   ª º3  3 ¬ ¼ ……(4) 
 
If, on the other hand, doctors have been selected to make offers, by a symmetric line of arguments, the 
equilibrium offer proposed by the doctors satisfies:  
> @ > @ > @  > @
> @
> @ > @  > @
,
,
i i i i
i i
i i i i i
M h D n D V M
n D n
D h D n J n V M
G
G
  
 
   
3  
 
ª º3  3 ¬ ¼
  (5) 
 
The next step, then, is to look closer at the players' continuation payoffs  > @iV L  ,  ,L M D  . Consider 
the doctors, for instance. Whenever in equilibrium they access a further stage of negotiations, they expect 
to go through a new random selection of the agent entitled to make a proposal. 
 
As shown above, a PSSPN equilibrium, at any node of the game at which they have been called to propose 
offers, doctors always propose an equilibrium offer  > @ ,i ih D n    ensuring a surplus of  
> @ > @ ,i i iD h D n 3  . On the other hand, at any node of the game at which the managers have been 
selected to make proposals, they always offer a PSSPN equilibrium pair  > @ ,i ih M n    which, by 
construction, delivers to the doctors a payoff  > @iV DG   . Therefore, we can immediately specify the 
doctors' continuation payoffs in a PSSPN equilibrium as: 
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> @ > @ > @    > @, 1i i i i iV D D h D n V DE E G    3    
which, by direct substitution of  > @i D3  , is equivalent to:  
> @ > @   > @  
> @
 1 1 1 1 1
i i
i i i i
J n V M
V D J n V M V D
E EGE G E G G E G E
 
    ª º3 ¬ ¼ª ºª º 3     ¬ ¼¬ ¼        (6) 
 
Analogous arguments allow characterizing the managers’ continuation payoffs in a PSSPN equilibrium as: 
> @     > @1 1
1 1
i i
i
J n V D
V M
E E G
EG EG
 
 ª º 3 ¬ ¼    
These equations have clearly a unique solution: in equilibrium managers and doctors expect the 
continuation values:  
> @     > @   
2 21
,  
1 1 1 1 1 1
i i
i i
J n J n
V M V D
E E
E G E E G E
 
 ª º ª º3  3¬ ¼ ¬ ¼         
 
As it can be noticed, the equilibrium continuation values depend on both  E   and  .G   In the limit scenario 
when the game converges to the case of perfectly patient agents, i.e. when  1,G o   the equation payoffs 
tend to:  > @     2 221 / 1i iV M J n E E E ª º 3   ¬ ¼   and  > @   22 2/ 1i iV D J n E E E ª º 3  ¬ ¼  , 
which, crucially, depend on the bargaining power  E  . When managers and doctors are equally likely to be 
selected to make offers, i.e.  1/ 2E   , they expect to split equally the surplus of the hospital, obtaining 
each  / 2.iJ n
ª º3 ¬ ¼   On the other hand, when doctors (managers) have all the bargaining power,  1E    
( 0E   ) doctors (managers) earn the whole hospital surplus. This last case represents a take-it-or-leave 
scenario. 
 
Finally, the equilibrium fee for service offers can be easily worked out as the  > @ih L  ,  ,L D M   which, 
given the above continuation values, solve the system:  
> @ > @  > @
> @ > @  > @
,
,
i i i i i
i i i i i
M h M n J n V D
D h D n J n V M
G
G
   
   
ª º3  3 ¬ ¼
ª º3  3 ¬ ¼
 
This returns the two, asymmetric, equilibrium fee for service offers by managers and doctors: > @  > @ , , ; , , , , ; , ,i i i i i i i i i ih M K T g h D K T gG E D G E D z  
with the exact expressions for  > @ih M   and  > @ih D   in Appendix A. 
 
Equilibrium is then reached at the first round with immediate acceptance. It is easy to check that there are 
no profitable deviations and therefore this pair of strategies is indeed the unique PSSPN equilibrium. 
It is interesting to notice some salient properties of such equilibrium. 
 
First, in the unique PSSPN equilibrium of the multi-issue bargaining game, the equilibrium agreed number 
of patients  in

  maximizes the joint surplus between managers and doctors  
   2 2
2 2 ( )i i i
n n K
i i i iT Q n g n
        . This implies that the bilateral negotiation between doctors and 
managers is Pareto efficient in the equilibrium number of treated patients. 
 
Optimal Contracts and Contractual Arrangements within the Hospital  11    
 
Second, the equilibrium fee for service is  > @ih D   if the doctors are selected to make offer at the first round, 
and  > @ih M   if the managers make proposals at the first round. Contrary to the number of treated patients, 
equilibrium offers for the fee are thus different. However, notice that, as  1G o  , i.e. if the game 
approaches the limit case of perfectly patient players, both proposals for the fee for service converge to the 
same equilibrium value
7
 
> @ > @  1 1 , , ; , ,i i i i i i ih M h D h K T gG G G E D  o o{ o  
This is clearly due to the fact that, when frictions due to impatience are negligible, the advantage 
experienced by the first player who has been selected to make offers disappears and the corresponding 
asymmetries in the proposed equilibrium fees for service also vanish. 
 
Notice, moreover, that the equilibrium level of the fee for service  (.)ih   corresponds to the one found by 
Miraldo (2000). This is due to the well-known property by which the equilibria of a non-cooperative 
bargaining game approximate the cooperative Nash bargaining solution as inter-temporal frictions 
disappear and  1G o  . Since such expression for  ih   is fully corresponding to the Nash solution and can 
be directly compared with the equilibrium fee for service under a contract scenario (in which impatience 
does not play any role), hereinafter we will refer to  ih

  as the unique equilibrium fee for service emerging 
under the bargaining scenario. 
 
The equilibrium of our non-cooperative negotiations game also shows an intuitive interpretation: when 
bargaining within the hospital, doctors and managers agree on setting the number of treated patients at a 
level which maximizes hospital profits, and then use the fee for service as an instrument to divide the 
generated profits. 
 
3.2 Government problem 
 
We now characterize the menu of contracts proposed to hospitals by the government. However, before 
doing so, it is helpful to provide, as a benchmark, the so-called full information contracts. These would be 
chosen by the government if it were aware of each hospital’s average illness severity  iD  . 
 
In such a case, for a given  iD  , the government chooses  > @, ,i i iT g K   to maximize the difference between 
the sum of the improvement in patients’ health    ,i i iQ n D   plus the hospital profits  Mi Di3 3  , and the 
total costs of health care,    1 i i i irK T g nO      , subject to the hospitals’ participation constraints -  
iIR   - by which  0Mi Di3 3 t  . In fact, when formulating its optimal contract, the government accounts 
for, within the total costs, the lump-sum transfers  iT  , the total fees for service  i ig n  , the cost of capital  r   
borne for any unit of capital invested in capacity  iK   and the direct and indirect distortions caused by the 
tax revenue raised to cover health expenditure:  > @0,1O   represents the shadow cost of public funds and 
captures the deadweight loss per unit of tax revenue. 
 
 
                                                 
7
Exact expression for   , , ; , ,i i i i ih K T gG E D   is in Appendix A. 
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Hence, for each hospital  1,2i   , the government problem is characterized by: 
    
, ,
, 1
. .
i i i
i i i Mi Di i i i iK g T
Max W Q n rK T g n
s t
D O  3 3    
 
 
^ `    
2
2
:    ; 0
2 2
i ii
i i i i i i i
n KnIR T Q n g nD

 
ª º« »    t« »¬ ¼
 
Given that public funds are costly then  / 0iW Tw w    and, consequently,  iT   will be chosen such that the 
participation constraints are just satisfied: 
     
2 2
;
2 2
i i i
i i i i i i
n n K
T Q n g nD
 
      
Substituting  iT   into  W   and maximizing with respect to  ^ `, ,i iK g   the full information (first-best) 
contracts must satisfy the following first order conditions: 
 
^ `  :    1 0    i i i ii i
i i i i i
Q J T nWK r g
K K K K K
O
ª º ª ºw w 3 w ww {       « » « »w w w w w¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
        (7) 
 
 
^ `  :    1 0     i i i ii i i
i i i i i
Q J T nWg g n
g g g g g
O

ª º ª ºw w 3 w ww {       « » « »w w w w w¬ ¼ ¬ ¼
 
where  i Mi DiJ3  3 3   is the total hospital surplus and  in    is the equilibrium number of patients 
treated, outcome of the negotiations between doctors and managers (3).  Note that, in the optimal contract,  
iK   and  ig   will be chosen such that the social marginal benefits (respectively  /i iQ Kw w     /i iJ Kw 3 w   
and  /i iQ gw w     /i iJ gw 3 w  ) equal the social marginal costs   (respectively  
/ /i i i i ir T K g n K
 w w  w w   and  / / )i i i i i iT g g n g n w w  w w    weighted by the shadow cost of public 
funds. Hence, in a full information contract, the government chooses  ig   and  iK   to optimally trade-off 
health outcomes and health care costs. Namely, the third party payer will weigh the improvement in 
patients' health status against the costs of treatment, ensuring that every population is served by one 
provider. When weighing the financial burden, in particular, the government takes also into account that  ig   
and  iK   directly affect the equilibrium number of treated patients  in

  as negotiated within the hospital at 
the last stage of the game. Moreover, the government also explicitly considers the cost of capital  r   and 
the indirect effects that both  ig   and  iK   exert on the levels of the lump-sum transfers  iT   necessary to 
induce hospitals' participation. 
 
It is worthwhile to notice, moreover, that  ig   and  iK   affect, in a positive and symmetric way, the 
equilibrium number of treated patients and are, therefore, perfect substitute instruments for the government 
in this respect. In fact,  / / 1/ 3i i i in g n K
 w w  w w   . Such a symmetric and positive impact characterizes 
also the effects of  ig   and  iK   on the improvement in patients' health status   ,i i iQ nD   . In fact,  
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, , 1 1 0
3 2
i i i i i i
i i
i i
Q n Q n
n
g K
D D D
 
w w § ·    !¨ ¸w w © ¹  
 
Computing explicit derivatives with respect to  iK   and  ig   and substituting in the above first order 
conditions, the policy instruments in the optimal contracts are as follows.
8
 
 
 
    
, ,
1/ 2 2 4 33 2
,     
2 2 3 2 3 2 3
ib pi b pii
i i
r
g K
D O OD
O O O
        
The full information fee per patient is increasing in casemix and decreasing with the shadow cost of the 
public funds. The capacity offered by a full information contract, on the other hand, is increasing with the 
casemix and decreasing with the cost of capital. As a consequence, the equilibrium number of treated 
patients agreed in the subsequent stage is:     
,
1/ 2 2 1
2 3 2 3
ib pi
i
r
n
D O O
O O
                                       (8) 
It can been noticed that, in the full information benchmark, the number of patients treated by the hospital 
only differs from the contractual capacity by a positive (but small) term related to the cost of capital.
9
 
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that the hospital’s interests with respect to the number of treated patients 
are not perfectly aligned with the government’s goals which also encompass the cost of capacity  r  . 
Finally, by comparing the number of treated patients across hospitals of different types, 
 , ,2 1 2 1 22 3b pi b pin n
OD D O
       
it is noticed that hospitals with higher casemix treat more patients and this difference is directly increasing 
with the distance in the average illness severity between the two populations. 
 
Of course, the full information policy cannot be implemented when the government is not aware of the 
hospital’s type. Indeed, as in a standard asymmetric information problem, the hospital with the less severe 
casemix has an incentive to claim of being a hospital of type  2  , in order to benefit from the more generous 
bundle  > @2 2 2, ,T g K  . In other words, the full information contracts are not incentive compatible. Therefore, 
the government should design its menu of contracts to induce the hospitals to truthfully reveal their true type. 
This is equivalent to ensuring that each hospital is better off by choosing a specific contract  > @, ,i i iT g K   
designed for its type rather than mimicking the other type and selecting its contract i.e.  iIC   are satisfied. 
Contracts should also satisfy Individual Rationality constraints ( iIR  ) for both types so that hospitals’ 
payoffs are large enough for them to operate: 
 
   
2
, , 1
2
1
,
1
. .
i i i
i i i i Mi DiK g T i
i i i i i
i
Max W p Q n
p rK T g n
s t
D
O

 

 
ª º 3 3 ¬ ¼
  
¦
¦  
                                                 
8
Note that the subscript  b, pi   has been used to identify the perfect information benchmark case within the bargaining scenario. 
9
In fact,     1 / 4 3O O      1   is verified as      0O !   
 
 
14    CHE Research Paper 37    
 
 
^ `      
2 2
:    ; 0
2 2
i i i
i i i i i i i
n n K
IR T Q n g nD
 
 
ª º« »    t« »¬ ¼
 
 
^ `      
      
2 2
2 2
:   ;
2 2
;
2 2
i i i
i i i i i i i
i i i
i ii i ii
n n K
IC T Q n g n
n n K
T Q n g n
D
D
 
 
 
   
  
ª º« »   « »¬ ¼
ª º« »t    « »« »¬ ¼
 
 
 
where,  iT  ,  iK   and  ig   stand for the elements of the contract intended for hospitals of the type 
opposite to  1,2i   , while  
    1 22 1 1,      3 2 2i i ii i iiig Kn Q n nD D        § ·   ¨ ¸© ¹    
denote the number of patients treated and corresponding health improvement, by a type  1,2i    hospital 
mimicking one of the opposite type  i  . 
 
Before proceeding with the optimal contract it is useful to investigate the properties of the hospital iso-profit 
curves. In particular, it is possible to check that a standard Single Crossing Condition holds, by which 
hospitals’ indifference curves get steeper as patients’ casemix gets more severe. In fact, given the number 
of treated patients decided by doctors and managers, one can write the hospitals’ indirect utility function  
 , , ;
iH i i i i i
v K g T TD    as: 
     
2 2
, , ; ( , )
2 2i
i i i
H i i i i i i i i i i i
n K n
v K g T T T Q n g nD D
 
  {      
Hence, by computing the total differential and the partial derivatives of   , , ;
iH i i i i i
v K g T TD    it is 
possible to write the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of  iK  ,  ig   and  iT  . For instance, it 
can be seen that:     
1
2
3
iH i i i i i i
i i i i i
i i i i i i
i i i
v T n Q n n n
n K g n n
g g n g g g
K g D
   
  

w  w w w w w      w w w w w w
   
 
The marginal rate of substitution among  iT   and  ig   can then be computed from  
    0H i H ii i
i i
v T v T
i iT gdT dg
w  w 
w w    as 
1
2
3
i i ii
i
K gdT
dg
D     
Therefore, as expected, hospitals’ indifference curves are downward sloping in the   ,i iT g   space. Thus, 
by analysing the derivative of the above expression with respect to  iD  , it is possible to study how such rate 
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of substitution varies with the average patients’ illness severity: 
0
i
i
H ii i
dT
v TdgD
w w  
We find that, given  2 1D D!  , the marginal rates of substitution is monotonic, so that the Single Crossing 
Condition holds. 
 
By analogous arguments, it can also be shown that:  
 2
12 0
2 1 4 2
1 0
3
i
i
i i
H ii i i i i
i
H ii i
dK K
v Tdg K g
dT
v TdK
D D
D
w  !w   
w   w
 
From the Single Crossing conditions, it follows that the  2IC   constraint is always automatically satisfied as 
long as constraints  2IR   and  1IC   are verified. This standard result is justified in view of the fact that only 
hospitals of type 1 have incentives to mimic hospitals of the other type in order to be allowed higher 
budgets. 
 
Moreover, given that public funds are costly, constraint  1IC   will bind at the optimum: the informational rent 
to be paid to hospitals of type 1 will be minimized, leaving such hospitals just indifferent between revealing 
their true type and mimicking hospitals of type 2. That is, the government will choose  1T   so that the 
following equality would be satisfied: 
^ `      
2 2
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1:   ; 2 2
n n K
IC T Q n g nD
 
        
       
2 2
2 2 2
2 22 1 22 ;2 2
n n K
T Q n g nD
 
     
 
 
 
In fact, the expression on the right hand side:  
        
2 2
2 2 2
2 22 2 1 2 1 22, ; ;2 2
n n K
R K g T Q n g nD D
 
 
­ ½° °    ® ¾° °¯ ¿
 
 
          (9) 
stands for the informational rent accruing to hospitals of type 1. Clearly, the lump sum remuneration of 
managers  1T   will be higher than in a full information case in order to induce hospitals to choose the 
contract intended for their type. Since this rent is positive, the participation constraint for hospital of type 1 
( 1IR  ) is also automatically verified. 
 
On the other hand, in the contract intended for hospitals of type 2 there will be no informational rent:  2T   will 
be chosen such that the hospital participation constraint just binds: 
^ `      2 22 2 2 22 2 2 2 2 2:  ;2 2n n KIR T Q n g nD        
In order to investigate the role of  iK  ,  ig   and  iT   in the government contract, it is useful to have a closer 
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look at the informational rent. Substituting  2T   in   2 2 1, ;bR K g D  , comparative statics’ analysis shows 
that the impact of both  2K   and  2g   on the above informational rent is negative and equal in magnitude. In 
fact: 
     2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1
2 2
, ; , ; 1 0
3
b bR K g R K g
K g
D D D Dw w    w w  
Therefore, the capacity and the fee for service are perfect substitutes as policy instruments targeted at the 
minimization of the informational rent. 
 
However, when looking at the design of the menu of contracts, we need to keep in mind that the 
government objective of provision of cost effective health care involves not only the minimization of the 
informational rent, but also the maximization of patients’ total health improvement and the control of health 
treatment’s costs. Therefore, the policy instruments in the optimal contracts will reflect the trade-off 
between all these elements. 
 
Maximizing  ,W   with respect to  iK   and  ig  , it can be seen that the optimal contract for the hospitals of 
type 1 is described by the following first order conditions, 
 
^ `
   
1 1 1
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1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
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where  1 1/J Kw 3 w   and  1 1/J gw 3 w   capture the impact of  1K   and  1g   on the overall hospital surplus 
while     1 1 1 1/ /Q n n K w w w w   and    1 1 1 1/ /Q n n g w w w w   stand for the effects of the policy instruments 
on the improvement on patients’ health status, an objective that the government is able to control only 
indirectly, through the influence on the equilibrium number  1n

  of patients negotiated within the hospital. 
On the other hand, the negative term in the second brackets multiplied by   1 O   represents the overall 
costs associated with the effect of the policy instruments on the equilibrium number of treated patients: in 
particular, concerning capacity, the costs are net of the beneficial effect on the increase in patients’ health 
status     1 1 1 1/ /Q n n K w w w w  , and include the cost of capacity  r  , the induced cost   1 1 1/n n g w w  of 
treated patients in terms of higher fees for services paid by the government, and the indirect cost     1 1 1 11 /K n n K ª º  w w¬ ¼   by sub-optimal utilization of the medical technology, arising anytime the 
number of treated patients diverges from the allowed capacity and as long as their relative rates of 
adjustment are different. Concerning the fees for service, as there is no related cost of capacity, costs, net 
of the beneficial health status improvement     1 1 1 1/ /Q n n K w w w w  , only include the induced cost  
1 1 1/n n g
 w w   of treated patients in terms of higher fees paid by the government, and the indirect cost  
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1 1 1 1/n K n g ª º w w¬ ¼   by congestion. 
 
The first order conditions for the contract intended for hospitals of type 2 are analogous to the ones for 
hospitals of type 1, while showing some supplementary terms standing for the impact of  2g   and  2K   on 
the informational rent   2 2 1, ;bR K g D  : 
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Hence, it can be immediately seen that the allocation of  ig   and  iK   will differ across different types. In 
particular, solving explicitly the above first order conditions, it can be seen that the allocation of both  1g   
and  1K   - targeted at hospitals with lower casemix – will not be distorted with respect to the full information 
benchmark:  
 
    
, 1
1 1
1,
1 1
2 2 1
2 2 3
2 1/ 2 2 1
2 3
b b pi
b b pi
rg g
r r
K K
D
O
O D O
O
   
      
                   (10) 
As a consequence, the number of patients of type 1 treated in equilibrium corresponds to the one treated in 
first best:      1,
1 1
1/ 2 2 1
2 3 2 3
b b pi rn n
D O O
O O
       
This set of results is standard in asymmetric information problems, and is known as the property of non 
distortion at the top. 
 
However, as both  2g   and  2K   are allocated taking into account the effects conveyed by the extra terms, 
the contract intended for hospitals of type 2 clearly differs from the full information benchmark. In fact, the 
government will choose the optimal allocations  2g   and  2K   in such a way as to trade off between the 
allocative efficiency goal and the minimization of the informational rent. 
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More precisely, the exact choice of  ^ `2 2,K g   in the optimal contract will depend on the interaction 
between the impact of these policy instruments on the informational rent reaped by hospital of type 1 and 
their direct and indirect effects on the other objectives envisaged by the government. Since,  
2 2/ / 0R g R Kw w  w w   , the minimization of the informational rent implies that at least one of these two 
instruments should be over-provided by the government. However, the socially optimal care supply must 
also consider patients' health status, hospitals' surplus, and the number of patients treated within the 
hospital. From the government's perspective, the latter target should optimally trade off the benefit from the 
enhancement of patients' health status with the reduction of the overall costs in health care provision, 
including the cost of capacity, the fees paid to doctors and the costs due to sub-optimal utilization of medical 
technology or to congestion, as captured by the terms  r  ,  2 2 2/n n K
 w w  ,  2 2/in n g w w  ,    2 2 2 21 /K n n K  w w   and     2 2 2 2/n K n g  w w  , respectively. Therefore, the optimal choice of  2g   
and  2K   will ultimately depend on the complex interaction between all the above effects. 
 
Solving explicitly the first order conditions the optimal menu of contracts can be characterized as,
10
 
  
        
 
   
 
2 1 2
2
2 1 2
2
2 1
2
2 1/ 2
2 3 2 3
2 2 2 1 4 2 1
2 2 3
2 2 2 2
2 2 3
b
b
b
rg r
r
K
r
n
O D D DOO O
O D D O D O O
O
D O OD
O
     
       
    
            (11) 
 
Comparing with the optimal contract under perfect information,  2 1,
2 2
2
0
3 2
b b pig g r
O D D OO
   !                             (12) 
it can be seen that the optimal contract’s fee for patients is always higher than in a first best allocation. Since 
the effects on the (reduction of) informational rent and on (the maximization of) patients’ health status 
prevail, hospitals with more severe casemix receive higher fees than under full information. 
Moreover it can be seen that the difference between the capacity levels under asymmetric and full 
information depends on the cost of capacity  r  :   2 1,
2 2 3 2
b b piK K r
O D D OO
                                       (13) 
In particular, for sufficiently low (high) cost of capacity, namely if     2 1( ) 3 2r D D O !    , the capacity 
allowed to type 2 hospitals is greater (lower) than the one under perfect information,  ,2 2
b b piK K!   
( 
,
2 2
b b piK K!  ). As capacity becomes cheaper, the government is willing to over-provide capacity to 
hospitals with more severe casemix. 
 
                                                 
10
The second order conditions are always satisfied. In fact, it is possible to see that the four leading minors are of alternating signs with 
the sign of the first leading minor being negative, i.e.  1 0H    
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The fact that both the allocations of  2K   and  2g   are distorted, is standard under asymmetric information 
contracts. However, it should be noticed that, even though both instruments are perfect substitutes (both in 
controlling the informational rent and in influencing the equilibrium number of patients and, thus, health 
status) the extent to which one will be preferred over the other will ultimately depend on the relative (social) 
cost of their usage. In that respect, when capacity becomes too expensive, then the government will 
substitute it away for  2.g   
 
Finally, the above trade-offs also imply that the number of patients treated in high casemix hospitals is 
larger than under perfect information:  2 1,
2 2 02 3
b b pin n
O D D
O
  !  
Notice, in fact, that this distortion, with respect to the first best, not only does not depend on the capacity 
cost but is also greater than the corresponding positive distortion in the capacity. Hence, hospitals with 
more severe casemix treat more patients, and such difference is greater than in the first best:  
   
 
2 1 2 1
, ,
2 1 2 1
2 1
3 2
2
3 2
b b
b pi b pi
n n
n n
OD D O
OD D O
 {  !
!  { 
 
 
 
4. Contract scenario 
 
In the contract scenario, doctors and managers act as two separate units, deciding  in   and  ih   
respectively. Doctors, given managers and government decisions, decide on the number of patients to be 
treated with therapy  H   by maximizing (1). The optimal number of treated patients is the level  
 ^ `22arg max ( , ) ;0ii ni D i i i i i in Q n h g nD  3 {      
As doctors treat patients with technology  H   until the treatment’s marginal benefit equals its marginal cost, 
it follows that    12
2
i i i
i
h g
n
D     
Notice that the equilibrium number of treated patients  in

  is increasing with casemix  iD  . Also notice that, 
under a contract scenario,  in

  is independent of the capacity  iK  contracted by the government, while it 
clearly depends not only on  ig   but also on the fee  ih   set by managers. Indeed, the fees for service paid 
by the managers and by the government are now perfect substitutes to the extent at which they affect the 
number of treated patients decided by doctors:  / / 0.i i i in g n h
 w w  w w !   On the other hand, contrary to 
the bargaining scenario, the impact of capacity and fee for services offered by the government are no longer 
symmetric. Indeed, while the capacity has no impact on doctors’ choices ( / 0i in K
w w   ), fees for service 
affect positively the number of patients treated and this effect is greater than the analogous under 
bargaining scenario. The same holds with respect to health benefits:  
 
1 1 0,      0
2 2
i i
i i
i i
Q Q
n
g K
D w w§ ·   !  ¨ ¸w w© ¹  
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Given doctors’ decision, managers will then offer the contract on  ih   that maximizes their own profits 
subject to the doctors’ participation constraint: 
 2
 
2
. .  0
i
i i
Mi i i ih
Di
n K
Max T n h
s t

3   
3 t
 
The contract works as a take-it-or-leave-it offer and therefore, as long as their non-negative profit constraint 
is satisfied, doctors will accept any fee for patient offered by managers. It can be checked that since  
/ 0Mi ihw3 w    and  0 0,ihU  !   then the manager will optimally set  0ih   11. 
 
Analogously to the bargaining scenario, in a perfect information scenario the menu of contracts offered by 
the government is be given by
12
:     
    
   
, ,
, , ,
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1
,   
2 3 2 3
2 1 2 2 1 2
,   
2 2 3 2 3
i ic pi c pi
i i
ic pi c pi c pi
i
r
g K r
r
n n n
D O O D
O O
D O O OD DO O
       
        
            (14) 
As the policy that would be optimal in case of full information cannot be implemented when the government 
is not aware of the hospital's type, the menu of contracts is designed by the government in order to 
maximize the total welfare function  W  , subject to the usual Individual Rationality ( iIR  ) and Incentive 
Compatibility ( iIC  ) constraints for both types  1,2i   : 
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where  in



  and  

iQ   denote the treated patients' number and health improvement, respectively, for the 
hospital of type  1,2i    mimicking one of the opposite type  i  . 
Note that also in the contract scenario the Single Crossing Conditions are verified (in Appendix B). 
                                                 
11
Notice that such a "corner" solution is also common to Boadway et al (2004) and serves us mainly as a benchmark scenario. 
12
The subscript  c, pi   has been used to identify the perfect information contract scenario. 
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In the optimum the contract for hospitals of type 1 is not distorted with respect to the perfect information 
benchmark (14) 
13
 ( 
, ,
1 1 1 1,
c c pi c c pig g K K    and  ,1 1 )c c pin n   while the one for the hospitals of type 2 is 
such that: 
 
   
      
   
 
2 1 2
2
2 1 2
2
2 1
2
2 1/ 2 2 1
2 3
5 2 1/ 2 1 2
2 3
2 2 2 2
2 2 3
c
c
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r
g
r
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r
n
O D D D O
O
D D O D O O
O
D O OD
O
     
       
    
                      (15) 
 
Finally, hospitals serving populations with higher average illness severity treat more patients than hospitals 
with lower average illness severity,   2 1
2 1
2 1
0
2 3
c cn n
D D O
O
   !  
Interestingly, this difference is the same under the bargaining and the contract scenario. 
 
Comparing the fee for type 2 with the perfect information benchmark, 
, 2 1
2 2 2 02 3
c c pig g D DO O
  !  
It turns out that, as in the bargaining set-up, hospitals of type 2 are given higher fees than in perfect 
information. However, given (12), this distortion is smaller in the contract than in the bargaining set-up. In 
particular, the distortion is smaller by a factor  rO   which is directly related to the cost of capacity. Indeed, 
while under bargaining scenario  2g   and  2K   were found to be perfect substitutes and the government 
was able to directly substitute away  2K   with  2g   when the cost of capacity was high, this is no longer the 
case under the contract scenario. 
 
Proceeding in a way analogous to the bargaining scenario, it can be shown that, even though both  2K   and  
2g   have a negative impact on the informational rent,  
   2 2 1 2 2 11 2 1 2
2 2
, ; , ;
0,    0
2 4
c cR K g R K g
K g
D DD D D Dw w    w w  
capacity  2K   is twice more effective in reducing the informational rent with respect to the fee for service  
2g  :  2 2/ / .
c cR K R gw w ! w w   
Comparing capacity levels: 
   ,2 2 2 1
2 5 2
2 2 3 2 3
c c piK K rO O D DO O
­ ½   ® ¾ ¯ ¿  
Hence, the capacity allowed to hospital of type 2 is the same as under perfect information only in the special 
                                                 
13
The expressions for the lump sum transfers are cumbersome. Given that their role is not so informative we do not explicitly state 
them in the paper. 
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case in which the cost of capacity assumes the punctual value      2 12 2 5 2 2 3r D D O O     . For 
sufficiently low (high) capacity prices the distortion in the allowed capacity is positive (negative): 
,
2 2
c c piK K!    ,2 2( )c c piK K  . That is, the outcome and the distortion with respect to the perfect information 
case are qualitatively the same under the contract and bargaining scenarios. 
 
 
5. Discussion 
 
In the last sections, we have presented the optimal financing contracts offered by a third party payer under 
bargaining and contracts within the hospital. In this section we further discuss those findings. 
 
As a benchmark, it may be helpful to start with a direct comparison between the government's contracts that 
would be offered in the two scenarios under perfect information. Regarding the fees for service it can be 
seen that, under perfect information, they are higher in the bargaining than in the contract scenario:  
, , 0b pi c pii ig g r  !  . Notice that the difference equals the cost of capacity. Intuitively this is related to the 
different role of  ig   under the two scenarios. In fact, as discussed above, the fee paid by the government to 
the doctors is a policy instrument that in both set-ups can be used to impact on the different elements that 
determine social welfare: the informational rent, the number of patients treated and their health benefit, and 
the social and private costs of treatment. 
 
Regarding the informational rent, clearly it is not an issue in the perfect information case. With respect to the 
monetary incentives the two scenarios differ. First, while in the bargaining scenario the equilibrium fee for 
service  ih

  is set such that the hospital's surplus is shared equally between doctors and managers, in the 
contract scenario  ih

  is set so that doctors are just provided the minimum monetary payment to induce 
their participation. Therefore, the government's scope to integrate monetary payments and to induce 
optimal doctors' behaviour is clearly higher in the contract than in the bargaining scenario. Therefore, given 
that, from doctors' perspective,  ih   and  ig   are perfect substitutes, one should expect higher fees paid by 
the government to doctors when managers choose  ih   unilaterally than when it is decided through bilateral 
negotiations. However, the different way in which the number of patients is set in the two scenarios may 
counterbalance and even crowd-out this effect. In fact, in the bargaining scenario the number of patients is 
also negotiated by both managers and doctors, and is, therefore, set, in equilibrium, at a level 
encompassing the interests of both parties, and taking into account the direct and indirect costs of the 
hospital, including the costs associated with inefficient use of capacity. On the other hand, under the 
contract scenario, the number of treated patients is decided exclusively by the doctors, who choose it in an 
opportunistic way disregarding the impact of their decision on the overall costs of the hospital. In fact they 
are more likely to strategically manipulate the number of treated patients in order to compensate the loss in 
their revenues due to the zero fees paid by managers, with artificially high revenues earned by inflating the 
number of treated patients above the optimal level. The complete split between the decision-making of 
doctors and managers within the hospital, in the contract scenario, would thus generate not only a failure of 
coordination on the optimal level of patients to be treated (from the hospital's point of view), but also a 
negative externality on the government in the form of higher fees to be paid to doctors. To counterbalance 
this effect, the government reduces its fees  ig   to compensate or even to dominate the first effect. 
 
With respect to the (socially) optimal number of patients treated, the government must trade-off increases in 
overall costs of health care provision against improved health outcomes. As discussed in the previous 
sections, an increase in the fee for service  ig   induces a higher number of treated patients in both 
contractual scenarios. The absolute size of such positive effect, however, is higher in the contract scenario 
( / / )c bi i i in g n g w w ! w w   and, therefore, a smaller level of the fee in the contract scenario is, therefore, 
sufficient to induce the same number of treated patients in the bargaining scenario and this may further 
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explain why  
, ,b pi c pi
i ig g!  . Moreover, in the contract scenario, since doctors decide  in   without 
internalizing the overall costs for the hospital, the number of treated patients does not depend on the 
capacity offered and, therefore, only  ig   can be used to control such number. On the contrary, in the 
bargaining scenario both  ig   and  iK   can be used in direct and perfect substitution to control the 
equilibrium number of treatments. Hence, under bargaining, the government can use  ig   instead of  iK   
as an instrument to affect  in

  whenever capacity is a relatively more expensive policy tool. Given that the 
relative price of fees with respect to capital is  1/(1 ),r   whenever, in the bargaining scenario, the 
government substitutes away one unit of capacity  iK   with a unitary increase in the fee  ig  , it is saving  r  , 
which also explains why  
, ,b pi c pi
i ig g r   . 
 
Furthermore, notice that, under perfect information, the government would allow exactly the same capacity 
under both scenarios  
, ,b pi c pi
i iK K  . In fact, with perfect information, capacity is chosen to maximize 
overall efficiency and to minimize the total costs of health care provision, including the costs of capacity 
which are identical in both scenarios. Therefore, also the number of treated patients is identical under both 
scenarios. 
 
We finally compare the contracts offered in both scenarios under asymmetric information. With respect to 
the contracts offered to type 1 hospitals, given the non-distortion-at-the-top result, the difference between 
bargaining and contract scenarios exactly corresponds to the difference under perfect information. On the 
other hand, perfect information contracts targeted at higher casemix hospitals are distorted under 
asymmetric information in order to minimize the informational rent. 
 
Given that, in the bargaining scenario, the fee for service  2g   and the capacity  2K   are perfectly 
substitutable in reducing the informational rent, while in the contract  2K   is twice more effective,  
1 2 1 2 1 2
2 2 2 22 3 4
c b b cR R R R
K K g g
D D D D D D  w w w w !   !  w w w w  
then, ceteris paribus, the distortion on the fee for service for the hospitals of type 2 should indeed be larger 
in the bargaining than in the contract set-up:   2 2 1 0.b cg g rO   !   
 
Indeed, as the use of capacity is costly, when the government substitutes away one unit of  2K   with a 
unitary increase in  2g   under the bargaining scenario, it still experiences the same envisaged reduction in 
the informational rent while it also benefits from a saving equal to  r  . 
 
Therefore, when the cost of capacity,  ,r   is low, the capacity allowed to hospitals of type 2 is greater than 
it would be optimal in perfect information under both contractual scenarios:  
,
2 2
b b piK K!  ,  ,2 2c c piK K!  . 
However, the effect is not the same in magnitude across the two contractual set-ups: in particular, for any 
given level of the costs of capacity, the capacity allowed to hospitals of type 2 is always smaller in the 
bargaining than in the contract:   2 2 1 22 0.b cK K O D D      Indeed, for a given cost of capacity  r  ,  2K   
is a less cost-effective policy in the bargaining than in the contract. Therefore, since the optimal level of 
capacity in the perfect information case is the same under both scenarios, even for low capacity costs, the 
over-provision of capacity, with respect to the optimum, is less pronounced under the bargaining than in 
contract scenario. 
 
Finally, it is worthwhile to underline that under both scenarios the government manages to induce the 
perfect information number of treated patients for both types of hospitals, and that such a level is equal 
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under both the bargaining and the contract scenarios. Nevertheless, the policy instruments used by the 
government to achieve such a result differ between the two scenarios. 
 
The last result we are going to compare across different scenarios is the informational rent. It is shown that 
when the costs of capacity are sufficiently low (high),  the rent allowed to hospitals of type 2 is lower (higher) 
in the contract scenario than in the bargaining set-up (comparisons in Appendix C). 
 
The ultimate reason beyond such a result is related to the interaction and trade-offs among all the described 
effects in action in both scenarios. In the contract scenario, in fact, the government faces more than one 
trade-off when designing the menu of contracts to offer hospitals with more severe casemix. If, on the one 
hand, an increase in the capacity  2K   is twice more effective in reducing the informational rent than an 
equivalent increase in fees paid to doctors  2g  , on the other, capacity  2K   is also more costly, as a policy 
instrument, than the fees paid to doctors. Hence, in the control of informational rents, the relative use of 
these two instruments will be decided on cost-effectiveness grounds. In particular, when  r   is low enough, 
the allowed capacity  2K   is much more cost-effective in reducing the informational rent than the fee  2g   
and, therefore, the government uses more intensively  2K   than  2g   to reduce the informational rent. 
 
Note that, while  2K   and  2g   are (imperfect) substitute instruments vis-à-vis the informational rent, in the 
contract scenario they can not be used interchangeably to control the number of treated patients, and to 
balance total costs of health care against patients' improved health. Indeed since doctors decide 
independently  in

  (without internalizing managers' objectives) then their decision is not affected by 
capacity levels     2 2 2 2/ / 0c cn K Q K w w  w w   . Moreover, also the fee paid by managers does not 
affect doctor's decisions since in equilibrium it is set at  0ih
   . Therefore, under the contract scenario, the 
fee for service  2g   is the only available instrument to control the number of treated patients and will be set 
in order to optimally trade-off between the direct and indirect costs of health care provision and the 
enhancement of patients' health status. Therefore, it is as if the separation of decisions units within the 
hospital, typical of the contract scenario, induces the government to use its main instruments  
c
iK   and  
c
ig   
in a similar "dedicated" way, by clearly separating their role and their impact: on the one hand, the capacity  
c
iK   is used to minimize the informational rent, provided that the cost of capacity  r   is low enough; on the 
other hand, the fee for service  
c
ig   is set to affect and to control the doctors' decision on the number of 
treated patients and to optimally trade-off the improvement in health status with the total costs of health 
care. 
 
Notice also that, in the bargaining scenario there is a trade-off in the use of  biK   against  
b
ig  . In fact, the 
government knows that the decision-making within the hospital is not separate but is an integrated one, in 
which doctors and managers negotiate simultaneously both on the number of treated patients and the fees 
for doctors. Hence, it can no longer easily identify which agent is ultimately responsible for an objective and 
which instrument is more appropriate to induce desired changes in the behaviour and the relevant variables. 
In fact, recall that  2K   and  2g   were found to be perfect substitutes in their impact on the rent and on the 
number of treated patients inducing the government to use the instrument associated to the lowest cost of 
utilization, namely,  .g   Therefore, in a sense, the integrated decision-making within the hospital induces 
the government to also treat its different policy targets in an integrated way and to use almost a unique 
policy instrument for all targets. 
 
Therefore, in the bargaining scenario  
b
ig   is a less specialized and less accurate instrument curbed to the 
achievement of two main government's objectives. This may represent an explanation of the above 
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described occurrence of higher informational rents under the bargaining scenario. In fact, as long as the 
cost of capacity  r   is low,  
c
iK   is used as a dedicated instrument to minimize the informational rent under 
the contract scenario, while  
c
ig   is exclusively targeted at the control of the optimal number of treated 
patients. Hence the fact that, in the contract scenario, there are two more precise, tailored and specialized 
instruments (instead of only one as in the bargaining scenario) explain the achievement of a lower 
informational rent under the contract scenario, when the cost of capacity is sufficiently low. 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We have studied the impact of different hospital organizational structures on the optimal contracts designed 
by third party payers when severity is hospital's private information. Namely, we have compared a 
multi-issue bargaining process between doctors and managers within the hospital with a scenario where 
doctors and managers decide independently, with managers proposing to doctors a take-it-or leave-it offer. 
Results found are of interest to policy makers. Indeed, we have shown that, not only, the government 
instruments, settled within contracts signed with providers, must be tailored according to the hospitals' 
organizational structure and decision-making procedures, but also that their effectiveness in eliciting 
information differs across the different contractual arrangements within the hospital. 
 
In particular, our results support the idea that designing radical organizational reforms within the hospitals 
must be based on thorough and articulated analysis of the induced policy implications. In fact, if on the one 
hand a scenario by which all the strategic variables are negotiated within the hospital between managers 
and doctors can lead to less opportunistic and less biased unilateral behaviour regarding the key financial 
and medical decisions (namely, the monetary incentives to doctors and the number of treated patients) on 
the other hand, however, it can also lead to further distortions in the government ultimate objectives, and, at 
least when the cost of capacity is sufficiently low, to less accurate and less effective policy tools aiming at 
reducing informational rents accruing to secondary care providers. 
 
In particular, policy insights ultimately depend on the cost of capacity. If we interpret the cost of capacity as 
the cost of capital, since public and private providers are likely to face different capital markets' conditions, 
the policy implications of our results will depend on the type of providers serving the market.  Since public 
providers normally benefit from a rate of return below the commercial rate faced by their private 
counterparts,
14
 we would expect a contract scenario to be more effective as an organizational structure if 
the secondary care market is served by public providers. 
                                                 
14
For example in England the commercial rate of return faced by private providers is 6.1% while the analogous for public providers is of 
3.5% (Mason et al 2007). 
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Appendix 
 
A  Strategic bargaining 
 
A.1  Fees expressions 
 
The exact expressions for the equilibrium fee-for-service proposed by managers and doctors in the 
bargaining are, respectively, 
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In the limit case of perfectly patient agents,  1G o  , both  ( )h M   and  ( )h D   converge to the identical 
expression  ih
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where  Z   and  H   are as in (16). 
 
B  Contract 
 
B.1  Single crossing conditions 
 
Under perfect information the optimal menu of contracts is such that: 
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Let  
iH i
v T   stand for the hospital indirect utility function, given managers and doctors solutions, 
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Computing the total differential and the partial derivatives of   , , ;
iH i i i i i
v K g T TD    it is possible to write 
the marginal rate of substitution between any pair of  iK  ,  ig   and  iT  . For instance, take  ig   and  iT   by 
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the implicit function theorem  
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Computing the partial derivatives,  
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Plugging these expressions into (17) and (18), and simplifying we find: 
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Differentiating with respect to  iD  ,  
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it turns out that the marginal rates of substitution are monotonic in  .iD   Therefore, the Single Crossing 
Conditions are verified. 
 
C  Comparison: bargaining vs. contract 
 
C.1  Rent comparison 
 
Substituting the optimal contract for the bargaining scenario given by (10) and (11) and the optimal contract 
for the contract scenario as described in (14) and (15) we obtain the informational rents under both 
scenarios,  
bR   and  cR  . Computing their difference: 
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